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COMMENTARY
Comparative Constitutional Law: Casebooks for a
Developing Discipline
Donald P. Kommers *
I. Introduction
Comparative constitutional law is a developing area of legal
scholarship. One sign of this development is the recent appearance
of two casebooks, both published in 1979. Comparative Constitutional
Law: Cases and Materials by Mauro Cappelletti and William Cohen,
focuses primarily on the procedural rights of defendants from the
United States and nine European jurisdictions. Comparative Constitu-
tional Law. Cases and Commentaries by Walter F. Murphy and Joseph
Tanenhaus, examines the constitutional interpretation of a large
number of substantive issues in six contemporary constitutional de-
mocracies. Both books were published after long periods of gestation.
The author-editors had experimented with the cases and materials in
their own comparative constitutional law classes long before making
them available to the general public.' Although organized for class-
room teaching and directed toward the beginning student, these
casebooks also indicate directions of possible research. Reviewing the
two books together provides an opportunity not only to compare
them as teaching tools but also to assess the nature and purpose of
comparative constitutional law as an evolving research enterprise.
Comparative constitutional law is by no means a new branch of
learning. Its ancestry dates back at least as far as Aristotle.2 Much of
* Professor of Law and Director, Center for Civil and Human Rights, University of
Notre Dame. B.A., Catholic University of America, 1954; M.A., Ph.D., University of Wis-
consin, 1957, 1962.
I Three of the editor-authors are American scholars: William Cohen is Professor of Law
at Stanford University; Walter F. Murphy is McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence in the
Department of Politics, Princeton University; Joseph Tanenhaus, now deceased, was Profes-
sor of Political Science at State University of New York at Stoney Brook. The fourth, Mauro
Cappelletti, an Italian legal scholar trained in both civil and common law traditions, is Pro-
fessor of Law at Stanford University and the European Law Institute in Florence, Italy. He
has taught courses in comparative constitutional law at both the Harvard and Stanford Law
Schools.
2 Aristotle is well known for his study of 158 Greek cities and tribes, the only surviving
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the modern literature, from Montesquieu to the present, consists of
analytical commentary based upon the study of constitutional texts.3
In contrast, the emerging literature, exemplified by the books under
review, focuses on constitutional judicial opinions. Shortly after
World War II, several countries created constitutional courts. The
activities of these courts4 have generated studies which tend to focus
on the structure and impact of judicial review in a single country or
on particular foreign cases marked by their political significance.5
remnant of which is his Constitution of Athens. See K. FRITZ & E. Kopp, ARISTOTLE'S CONSTI-
TUrION OF ATHENS AND RELATED TExTs (1950).
3 In this genre one may include MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (1747), and twen-
tieth century treatises of widely varying scope and length, such as J. BRYCE, STUDIES IN
HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE (2 vols. 1901); J. BURGESS, POLITICAL SCIENCE AND CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAw (2 vols. 1913); C. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DE-
MOCRACY (4th ed. 1968); C. MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM ANCIENT AND MODERN
(1958) and CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE CHANGING WORLD (1969); K. WHEARE, MOD-
ERN CONSTITUTIONS (2d ed. 1966); and C. STRONG, A HISTORY OF MODERN CONSTrru-
TIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THEIR HISTORY AND, EXISTING
FORMS (1964). An important older work in the classical historical tradition is C. CRANE,
POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(1884). Modem works, mainly descriptive in character, include V. FRANCISCO, A COMPARA-
TIVE STUDY OF DIFFERENT CONSTITUTIONS (1956); B. GUPTA, COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
Six LIVING CONSTITUTIONS (1974); K. GLASER, COMPARATIVE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS
(1948); K. AzIz, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1979); and
S. WOLF-PHILLIPS, CONSTrrUTIONS OF MODERN STATES (1968). ee also I. DUCHACEK,
POWER MAPS: COMPARATIVE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONS (1973) and H. MAARSEVEEN &
G. TANG, WRITTEN CONSTITTIONS: A COMPUTERIZED COMPARATIVE STUDY (1978).
4 See generally M. CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD
(1971) and Kommers, Judial Review: Its InjAwe Abroad, 428 ANNALS 52-64 (1976). For a
general discussion ofjudicial review in English-speaking countries, see E. MCWHINNEY, JUDI-
CIAL REVIEW (4th ed. 1969).
5 This is a diverse literature representing different disciplinary and methodological per-
spectives. Works in English include conventional legal and political studies such as R.
BAKER, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN MEXICO (197 1); B. STRAYER, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LEGISLA-
TION IN CANADA (1968); D. KOMMERS, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN WEST GERMANY: A STUDY
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT (1976); B. LOREN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF JU-
DICIAL REVIEW IN IRELAND, 1937-1966 (1967); E. MCWHINNEY, SUPra note 4; and P. BLAIR,
FEDERALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW IN WEST GERMANY (1981). Sociological and behavioral
perspectives are illustrated in various chapters of COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (G.
Schubert & D. Danelski eds. 1969) andJ. GROSSMAN &J. TANENHAUS, FRONTIERS OFJUDI-
CiAL RESEARCH (1969). See also T. BECKER, COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL POLITICS: THE POUr-
ICAL FUNCTIONING OF COURTS (1970) and Syaposium - The Political Impact of Constitutional
Courts, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 952-1050 (1974). For an analytical review of several books
mentioned in this and the following two notes, see Kommers, Comparative Judicial Review and
ConstitutionalPolitics, 24 WORLD POLITICS 282-97 (1975). Commentary on individual cases is
quite substantial and appears mainly in the legal periodical literature. With regard to the
Federal Republic of Germany, for example, leading case commentaries include McWhinney,
The New German Federal Constitutional Court and the Communist Party Decision, 32 IND. L. J. 295
(1957); McWhinney, Federal Constitutional Law and the Treaty-Making Power - Decision of the
West eman Constitutional Court, 32 CAN. B. REV. 842 (1957); Loewenstein, The Bonn Constitu-
tion and the European Defense Community Treaties: A Study inJudicial Frustration, 64 YALE L. J. 805
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More comparative in their approach are studies of constitutional
cases drawn from two or more countries, 6 along with a few explora-
tory casebooks.7 These resources, however, employ a variety of ana-
lytical frameworks and differ in their comparative value. On the
whole this literature projects no common vision of the teaching or
research enterprise. Scholars have tended their separate gardens, the
result being a rather fortuitous collage of methodological and sub-
stantive approaches largely resistant to classroom adaptation.
By contrast, one strength of the books under review is their util-
ity as teaching tools. Adaptable to various levels of instruction, they
could serve, separately or together, as the nucleus of comparative
constitutional law classes in law schools or in political science depart-
ments. Although the books differ in their treatment of case analysis,
they are nevertheless compatible with a variety of teaching methods.
Before considering the two books in detail, a short description of
their general content is necessary. Surprisingly, they contain little
duplication. Both books include cases on abortion and both draw
heavily from the work of the Supreme Court of the United States
(1955); Doeker, West German Federal Republic. Television Competence, 10 AM. J. COMP. L. 277
(1961); Kommers, The Spiegel Seizure Case, in T. BECKLER, POLITICAL TRIALS 5-33 (1971);
Bernstein, West Germany Free Press and National Securi. Reections on the Spiegel Case, 15 AM. J.
COMP. L. 547 (1967); Kommers, Politics and Jurisprudence in West Germany: State Financing of
Political Parties, 16 AM. J. JURIS. 215 (1971); and Gerstein & Lowry, Abortion, Abstract Norms,
and Social Control The Decision of the West German Federal Constitutional Court, 25 EMORY L. J.
849 (1976).
6 Examples are R. JOHNSTON, THE EFFECT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW ON FEDERAL-STATE
RELATIONS IN AUSTRALIA, CANADA, AND THE UNITED STATES (1969); K. Ishimine, A Com-
parative Study of Judicial Review Under American and Japanese Constitutional Law (J.S.D.
Thesis, Cornell University, 1974); F. CASTBERG, FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE WEST: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PUBLIC LAW IN FRANCE, THE UNITED STATES, AND GERMANY
(1960); T. KOOPMANS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF EQUALITY (1975); V. MACKIN-
NON, COMPARATIVE FEDERALISM (1964); E. MCWHINNEY, COMPARATIVE FEDERALISM
(1962); A. SMITH, THE COMMERCE POWER IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES (1963); P.
POLYVIOU, THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS (1980); Trombetas, The United States
Supreme Court and the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany - Some Comparative Observations, 17
REVUE HELLENIQUE DE DROIT INT'L 281 (1964); Casper, William v. Rhodes and Public Fi-
nancing of Political Parties Under the American and German Constitutions, 1969 SUP. CT. REV. 271;
Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 703 (1980); Kommers, The
Jurisprudence of Free Speech in the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, 53 S. CAL. L.
REV. 657 (1980); and Kommers, Abortion and the Constitution: United States and West German,.25
AM. J. COMP. L. 255 (1977).
7 Particularly noteworthy are H. GROVES, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS (1963) and T. FRANCK, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROCESSES (1968). Still another collection of cases is F. BALDWIN, JR., COMPARATIVE CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW: MEXICO-UGANDA-UNITED STATES: CASES-ARTICLES-COMMENTS-
QUESTIONS (Harvard International Legal Studies Center 1974). English translations of Japa-
nese constitutional cases appear in COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN JAPAN (J. Maki ed. 1964).
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and the West German Federal Constitutional Court, but this is the
extent of their common coverage. Apart from the American and
German tribunals, Murphy and Tanenhaus have chosen their cases
from the highest courts of Japan, Canada, Australia, and Ireland;
Cappelletti and Cohen from various superior courts of Austria,
Belgium, England, France, Italy, and Switzerland as well as from the
Court of Justice of the European Communities and the European
Court and Commission of Human Rights. Topically, Murphy and
Tanenhaus have organized 144 cases around 11 different themes, in-
cluding separation of powers, federalism, foreign affairs, economic
regulation, and various subjects related to the fundamental rights of
persons. Cappelletti and Cohen, on the other hand, present 88 cases
dealing mainly with the procedural rights of criminal and civil de-
fendants. Many of the cases in both volumes appear in English
translation for the first time.
The author-editors have included materials and commentaries
that help to elucidate the cases. Murphy and Tanenhaus preface
their presentation of the cases with a description of the legal and
political systems of each nation covered. Additionally, each topical
chapter is preceded by a short essay describing the functions of the
six constitutional courts from which the cases are drawn. Cappelletti
and Cohen, on the other hand, rely primarily on secondary sources to
review the history and types of judicial review in Europe. Adapted
from an earlier work by Cappelletti, 8 this section discusses the move-
ment toward judicial control of constitutionality in Europe after
World War II and the variations in modern systems of judicial re-
view. This section touches themes such as separation of powers and
economic regulation which are more explicitly treated in Murphy
and Tanenhaus. Cappelletti and Cohen also include secondary read-
ings on the sources of higher law emerging from the European Com-
munity treaties and the European Convention on Human Rights.
This background material on judicial review, absent in Murphy and
Tanenhaus, helps to illuminate the context in which European
judges decide constitutional cases. In many ways the two books are
complementary. The weaknesses and omissions of one book are rem-
edied by the strengths and contributions of the other.
8 See note 4 sufira.
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II. The Comparative Enterprise
A. Defining the Field
Comparative legal scholars have long disagreed about the na-
ture of their enterprise. For some, comparative law is a method; for
others, a science. 9 The books under review avoid this debate. They
simply presuppose that comparative constitutional law is more than
a method. It is considered a form of knowledge valued for its own
sake. To be sure, it is not an organized body of knowledge analogous
to theoretical physics or even to the domestic law of torts. These
observations, however, are not meant to disparage the author-editors'
work. The books under review are collections of cases, not systematic
treatises intended to distill the essence of a discipline. Indeed, the
argument can be made that comparative constitutional law is more
"art" than "science." It is a profoundly human task characterized
less by a fixed methodology than by the prudent application of what
Aristotle called "practical wisdom."' 0
The significance of the books under review is that they begin to
organize the field in a manner that is both useful and intellectually
fulfilling. Judicial decisions and opinions are their primary data.
The two books invite the student to examine a selection of foreign
cases in order to understand the process of constitutional interpreta-
tion in different political and cultural settings. The organizing prin-
ciple of the enterprise, following the lead of these books, is the
problem of governance in two or more nations. For Murphy and
9 Scholarly views of comparative law as method are H. GUTrERIDGE, COMPARATIVE
LAW (2d ed. 1971); R. DAVID, LES GRANDS SYSTEMES DE DRorr CONTEMPORAINS (3rd ed.
1969); Kamba, Comparative Law: A Theoretical Framework, 23 INT'L COMP. L. Q. 485 (1974);
0. Kahn-Freund, Comparative Law as an Academic Subject, 82 L. Q. REV. 40 (1966); and D. JAIN
& A. MATHUR, COMPARATIVE LAW (1979). Those treating it as science include Rheinstein,
Teaching Tools in Comparative Law, I Am. J. COMP. L. 95 (1952); Yntema, Comparative Law and
Humanim, 7 Am. J. CoMp. L. 493 (1958); and J. HALL, COMPARATIVE LAW AND SOCIAL
THEORY (1963). The terms "method" and "science" have been used loosely, and occasionally
interchangeably, in the literature. Generally, however, those defining comparative law as
"method" have focused on the rather elementary task of describing the similarities and differ-
ences between legal rules and concepts, often for the practical purpose of advising clients or of
improving or reforming legislation. Those defining it as "science" have tended to adopt a
sociological approach to explain the function of law in society or a philosophical approach to
identify legal norms and principles common to two or more countries. For a general discus-
sion of the various approaches to comparative law, see Comparative Law and Its Teaching in
Modern Society, Proceedings of the Seventh International Symposium on Comparative Law,
August 27-29, 1969 (1970). One of the best short descriptions of the functions, aims, methods,
and history of comparative law is contained in 1 K. ZWEIGERT & H. KoETz, AN INTRODUC-
TION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 1-56 (1977).
10 Aristotle, Nicomanchean Ethics, Book VI, chap. 12, in R. McKEON, THE BASIC WORKS
OF ARISTOTLE 1035-36 (1941).
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Tanenhaus the problem is largely one of balancing liberty and au-
thority within the political order; for Cappelletti and Cohen it is
achieving fairness and effective access to justice in civil and criminal
legal proceedings.
Murphy and Tanenhaus envision the enterprise as "illustra[ting]
on a cross-national basis judicial involvement in formulating public
policy." Their editorial notes encourage students to read the cases
with a watchful eye on the cultural, social, and political influences
behind judicial policy. More importantly, their materials highlight
the link between judicial policy and certain methods of constitutional
interpretation. Cappelletti and Cohen, on the other hand, are more
doctrinally oriented. Their case selections underscore the difference
between constitutional rules pertaining to defendants' rights in civil
and common law systems. Cappelletti and Cohen, however, also
stress the increasing convergence in the rules of the two systems. In
stressing this convergence, they suggest that the transnational harmo-
nization of constitutional procedural law is related to the phenome-
non of judicial review and to the higher law on which judicial review
is based. For them comparative constitutional law is an explicitly
normative undertaking, a search for better rules of constitutional or-
der and more effective access to justice. The differing perspectives of
the two volumes, however, should not be exaggerated. Cappelletti
and Cohen, although chiefly interested in doctrine and prescription,
remain aware of the environmental influences determining the com-
position of constitutional policy. By the same token, Murphy and
Tanenhaus have not permitted their heavier accent on policymaking
to hide their concern for the proper ordering of constitutional values.
B. Choosing Countries and Cases for Comparison
A closer examination of the contents of the two texts will under-
score both the difficulty and the promise of comparative constitu-
tional law as a field of study. Initially, the author-editors faced the
problem of choosing political systems and constitutional courts that
would best lend themselves to comparative analysis. The nature and
number of countries selected for comparison in introductory
casebooks are important considerations. First, the countries should
not be so numerous as to risk comparisons that are superficial, unsys-
tematic, or excessively eclectic." Second, they should not be so di-
verse as to make comparative evaluation difficult.
11 These are criticisms lodged against studies in comparative law generally. For a fuller
discussion of these criticisms, see A. WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS 10-15 (1974).
[Vol. 57:6421
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In the texts under review, the author-editors chose countries
which are properly related to one another. All are modern pluralistic
democracies with developed economies, largely secular political cul-
tures, and multi-party electoral systems. Against a backdrop of rapid
cultural change and technological acceleration, these countries are
all faced with similar problems of governance. Yet there are substan-
tial differences in their cultural, political, religious, and legal histo-
ries. This particular admixture of similarity and difference makes
these countries inviting candidates for comparative legal analysis.
The decision of Murphy and Tanenhaus to confine their cover-
age to the United States, Australia, Ireland, Canada, West Germany,
and Japan has considerable merit. First, all the foreign systems, with
the possible exception of West Germany, have tribunals similar in
organization and jurisdiction to the United States Supreme Court.
Even the Federal Constitutional Court of West Germany was par-
tially modeled after the American Court,1 2 as was the Supreme
Court of Japan.13 Second, all six courts have produced comparable
bodies of constitutional jurisprudence. The doctrinal outcomes and
constitutional reasoning, however, differ considerably from country
to country, as the cases demonstrate. Third, four of the six are Eng-
lish-speaking countries with common law backgrounds, thus mini-
mizing the linguistic problems likely to arise from the translation of
foreign constitutional cases. (The judicious choice of German and
Japanese cases, along with excellent translations and superior edit-
ing, has also helped to minimize these problems.) Fourth, the au-
thor-editors have chosen non-English-speaking tribunals for which
there exists substantial secondary literature by American scholars. 14
Lastly, four of the six countries chosen by Murphy and
Tanenhaus have federal systems of government. Greater unity and
comparability might have been achieved by focusing exclusively on
federal systems. This approach, however, would have required the
omission of Irish and Japanese cases that offer pointed contrasts to
several American civil liberties cases. The author-editors might have
included other federal systems with courts of judicial review, such as
India, Switzerland, Austria, and Malaysia, thereby exposing students
to an even wider variety of constitutional thought concerning the
12 See D. KOMMERS, JUDICIAL POLITICS, supra note 5, at 86.
13 See Nathanson, Constitutional Adjudication in Japan, 7 AM. J. COMP. L. 195-218 (1958).
14 Much of the literature on the Federal Constitutional Court is included in note 5 supra.
For a representative collection of articles on the Japanese Supreme Court, see D. HENDER-
SON, THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN: ITS FIRST TWENTY YEARS, 1947-1967 (1968). See also
Ishimini, supra note 6.
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vertical distribution of political power.' 5 On the other hand, the
comparison of federal systems varying sharply in their vertical distri-
butions of power might seem inappropriate for comparative analysis.
The purpose of the cases, however, is not to introduce the student to
new ideas about federalism but rather to illustrate the role of consti-
tutional courts in establishing the boundaries of power among levels
of government in representative federal systems.
What the student learns from the distribution of power cases is
that federalism and separation of powers can never be defined with
precision. The task of interpretation must begin where the constitu-
tional framers left off. The student learns that little about constitu-
tional interpretation is wholly predictable. Judges may resort to a
wide range of legitimate techniques, precedents, and doctrines in ar-
riving at their decisions. Notwithstanding the often apparent clarity
of a particular governmental division of power, courts of judicial re-
view in a constitutional democracy are called upon continually to
define and redefine the boundaries between units and levels of gov-
ernment. American students who look to their own constitutional
cases for the last word on federalism may be surprised to find foreign
constitutional courts, like the Supreme Court of Australia, examining
American cases and rejecting their teaching. Students will also find
that doctrinal outcomes x ary according to the theory of constitu-
tional interpretation a court uses.
Cappelletti and Cohen, like Murphy and Tanenhaus, have lim-
ited their coverage to long-established, stable constitutional democra-
cies. But there seems to be less rhythm to their grouping of nations.
The number of decisions they have chosen from each nation varies
greatly. Most of the European cases are from the high courts of Aus-
tria, France; Germany, and Italy. Belgium, England, and Switzer-
land are each represented by a single judicial opinion and thus play
minor roles in the overall comparison. Recall that the comparison is
primarily between civil and common law systems. Regarding de-
fendants' rights, however, the common law side is represented only
by the United States. This selection of nations raises the question
15 The idea of federalism drawn from federal systems, old and emergent, is discussed in
C. FRIEDRICH, CoNsTITUToNAL GOVERNMENT 186-227 (4th ed. 1968). For a treatment of
judicial review in Austria and Switzerland, see VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT IN DER
GEGENwART 439-88, 506-26 (H. Mosler ed. 1962). For Malaysia, see Sheridan, Constitutional
Adjudication in Malaysia, in 2 K. BRACHER, DIE MODERNE DEMOKRATIE UND IHR RECHT
581-606 (1966). For India, see Kapur, Federalism under the Indian Constitution, Id at 695-742. A
more general treatment of Indian judicial review is E. MCWHINNEY, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN
THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING WORLD 126-55 (3d ed. 1965).
[Vol. 57:642]
THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER
whether the author-editors would have suggested the same pattern of
divergence and similarity between the two legal systems had addi-
tional common law countries been included in the casebook. (The
international cases, as noted earlier, were included to show the emer-
gence of judicial review as a transnational phenomenon.)
By contrast, Murphy and Tanenhaus have included a large
number of cases from each country. United States cases
predominate, as in Cappelletti and Cohen, but the number of consti-
tutional cases from the other countries ranges from eleven for Austra-
lia to twenty-seven for Canada. Constitutional cases from at least
four countries are represented in each topical chapter, but most of
the chapters include cases from five or all the countries. The student
is thus given the opportunity to approach the topic comparatively
throughout the text. In Cappelletti and Cohen, the author-editors'
tendency to consider the American cases more in relationship to one
another than to corresponding European cases occasionally side-
tracks the comparative enterprise.
The case selection in Murphy and Tanenhaus enhances the
comparative value of the text. The author-editors highlight cases
elaborating on constitutional doctrine at great length and cases en-
riched by dissenting opinions. The constitutional cases in Cappelletti
and Cohen, on the other hand, are not of the same caliber. Several of
the tribunals from which the cases are drawn do not have the status
of major constitutional courts. The French Constitutional Council,
for example, is powerless to review enacted laws. 16 Likewise, al-
though the international tribunals may represent models of judicial
review, they differ substantially from national constitutional courts.
In short, Cappelletti and Cohen advance a notion of judicial review
much broader than that of Murphy and Tanenhaus. In fairness,
however, it should be noted that Cappelletti and Cohen are mainly
interested in illustrating how the idea of judicial review or constitu-
tional review 7 has begun to take shape in Europe, particularly under
16 See Tunc, The Fif2h Republic, The Legislative Power, and Constitutional Review, 9 AM. J.
COMP. L. 335-43 (1960), and Waline, The Constitutional Council of the French Republic, 12 AM. J.
COMP. L. 483-93 (1963).
17 The Germans have distinguished between judicial review and constitutional review.
Judicial review (richterliche Prueimgsrecht) is a procedure by which courts determine the consti-
tutionality of laws in the ordinary course of litigation; it is mainly a twentieth-century devel-
opment in Germany. Constitutional review (Staatsgerichtsbarkeit) antedates judicial review,
going back at least to early nineteenth-century German state constitutions. It is a judicial
procedure for the resolution of controversies between units of levels of government about their
respective rights and duties under the constitution. Disputes concerning the legitimacy of
elections and referenda, ministerial impeachments, and the validity of amendments to the
[April 1982]
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the influence of supranational tribunals. For example, the opinion of
Lord Denning in HP. Bulmer Ltd v. J. Bollinger SA. ,18 the only Eng-
lish case in the textbook, shows that some. British courts are develop-
ing a feel for "constitutional" adjudication because the Court of
Justice in Luxembourg has required them to review domestic law in
light of European treaty law.
C. Problems of Interpretation
A critique of Cappelletti and Cohen should bear in mind the
author-editors' three purposes: (1) to compare constitutional proce-
dural rules in common and civil law countries; (2) to consider the
justice of those rules; and (3) to illustrate the emergence and increas-
ing acceptance of judicial review in European civil law jurisdictions.
The third objective is pursued in the first part of the book. In this
section the author-editors describe a "structural analysis of constitu-
tional adjudication in the contemporary world." Most of the mate-
rial in this section includes secondary articles and commentaries on
European constitutional review - both judicial and political. The
last two-thirds of the book undertake the comparative enterprise. Se-
lected cases from seven countries and two international tribunals
(European Court and Commission of Human Rights) are organized
into chapters on the right of action, notice and fair hearing, judicial
independence, the "natural judge,"19 the right to counsel, illegally
obtained evidence, and abortion, in that order. Interestingly, the
abortion section, which was apparently annexed as an afterthought
to add dramatic flair to the otherwise technical character of the pre-
ceding materials, is most valuable from a comparative perspective. 20
Several observations are warranted regarding the procedural
constitution were, in general, other examples of constitutional review. Constitutional review
in Germany, unlike judicial review in the United States, never included the authority of a
court to nullify legislative acts on constitutional grounds. Both judicial review and constitu-
tional review are species of what now is generally known as constitutional jurisdiction
(Verfassungsegechtsbarkeit). See D. KOMMERS, JUDICIAL PoLrrIcs, supra note 5, at 29.
18 Court of Appeal, [1974] 2 All E.R. 1226.
19 In the European context this right means that no person may be removed from juris-
diction of his lawful judge. The "natural judge" provision of the West German Basic Law
(Art. 101), for example, is a ban on extraordinary courts.
20 The decisions are from the United States (Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)); France
(Decision ofJanuary 15, 1975, Conseil Constitutionnel, [1975] D.S. Jur. 529); West Germany
(Decision of February 25, 1975, 39 BVerfGE 1(1975)); Italy, Carmosina et al., Corte costitu-
zionale, Decision of February 18, 1975, No. 27 [1975] 20 Guir. Const. 117); and Austria
(Decision of October 11, 1974, [1974] Erklaerungen des Verfassungsgerichtshofs 221). In ad-
dition to the U.S. and German cases, Murphy and Tanenhaus add a third from Canada
(Morgentaler v. The Queen [1975] 20 C.C.C. (2d) 449).
[Vol. 57:642]
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rights cases. First, the organization of the materials in the order
noted above appears, as the author-editors acknowledge, "unconven-
tional and, perhaps, illogical." For example, the chapters on the
right of action and notice and fair hearing might have more properly
followed the chapters on judicial independence and access to courts.
Cappelletti and Cohen consciously sought, however, to arrange the
materials to emphasize from the start the divergence between civil
and common law legal systems and then proceed to those areas
where the two systems have increasingly converged. But this organi-
zation also led to an excessive preoccupation toward the end of the
volume with American cases, creating the impression that the com-
parative enterprise is not really getting off the ground. The tendency
of the author-editors to compare American cases with one another
results in part from their concern for the quality of the rules embodied
in those cases.
Apparently it is not easy to find cases from the various countries
"on all fours" with one another. Consider, for example, Cappelletti
and Cohen's treatment of the right to defense counsel. The chapter
begins not with constitutional cases but with a general description of
detention procedures in England and France. This highlights the
differences between a common law and a civil law country in that
regard. No cases, however, are drawn from either nation. The two
European Court of Human Rights cases which follow, like the previ-
ous material, do not address defendants' rights issues as such, but
show these international "tribunals" struggling unsuccessfully to
bridge the gap between civil and common law rules on detention
without trail. An editorial note follows, indicating that Germany
and Italy, in response to these decisions, have modified, to the advan-
tage of criminal defendants, their rules on pretrial detention. Subse-
quent cases show the increasing tendency of various European courts
to uphold the right of counsel, but the context differs markedly from
case to case. Nevertheless, the link connecting the European and
American cases is provided by helpful notes and commentaries, al-
though it is not always clear to what extent the civil law countries
represented in the volume differ from one another in their procedural
rules.
A problem with several European opinions in the text is their
brevity. In many cases, the judges do not describe the constitutional
reasoning and techniques leading to the result. (The opinions of the
West German and Italian constitutional courts are happy excep-
tions.) Cappelletti and Cohen try to make up for this deficiency
through editorial notes and related secondary materials. On the
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other hand, their primary interest is in the cases' results, and here the
comparative method proves to be a good tool for raising important
value questions about the results.
Murphy and Tanenhaus's text parallels the organization and
content of conventional casebooks in American constitutional law.
The book includes chapters on federalism, separation of powers, na-
tional power over foreign and domestic policy, and various civil liber-
ties issues. Each chapter opens with representative American cases,
followed by comparable foreign cases. A casebook of such scope, if it
is to be kept to manageable size, cannot do full justice to the constitu-
tional law of each nation covered. For example, in the chapter on
religious freedom, the student gets only the barest glimpse of German
"free exercise" jurisprudence in the one case representing the Federal
Republic. The same chapter includes an American blood transfusion
refusal case but omits the text of an analogous and equally important
blood transfusion case decided by the Federal Constitutional Court.21
In the chapter on equality, which includes three leading American
cases on equal educational opportunity, some relevant German
"right to education" cases are also conspicuously absent.22 The au-
thor-editors might have had better success if they had focused exclu-
sively on educational equality. A more complete picture of the
constitutional problem and the standards of review adopted to re-
solve it could then have been presented. The chapter comes close to
this kind of unity in its treatment of five cases from four countries
dealing with the rights of married women. (These cases are cogent
demonstrations of the influence of culture on judicial outcomes.) Yet
the two German cases represented in the chapter do not disclose the
complexities and contradictions that mark German constitutional
law in the field of gender discrimination.
Murphy and Tanenhaus' casebook, however, is not to be judged
by its omissions. As noted previously, the cases serve mainly as vehi-
cles for comparing methods of constitutional interpretation. On the
other hand, students should be cautioned about problems of interpre-
tation that arise even from the existing textual materials. One no-
tices, for example, in the chapter on religious freedom, that the
German and American cases refer to the neutrality of the state with
respect to religious belief. These cases cannot be fully understood un-
21 The American case, decided by Judge Skelly Wright, is Application of Georgetown
College, 331 F.2d 1000 (1964). For the German case, see Judgment of October 19, 1971, 32BVerfGE 98.
22 Decision of July 18, 1972, 33 BVerfGE 303 (1972); Decision of February 8, 1977, 43
BVerfGE 291 (1977); Decision of June 22, 1977, 45 BVerfGE 393 (1977).
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til the student appreciates that religious neutrality has profoundly
different meanings in the constitutional law of these two nations.
There is a similar problem in bridging the gap between concepts
such as the German Recdstaat and the English "rule of law." Even
foreign terms having a literal equivalence in English - "rationality,"
"proportionality," "state," and "democracy" - may not be used in
conceptually equivalent ways. The student should be advised of the
different nuances often associated with these terms in foreign cases.
In conclusion, these observations are less a criticism of what Murphy
and Tanenhaus have accomplished in their casebook than a sugges-
tion of how much richer the field of comparative constitutional law
could be.
III. Concluding Commentary
A. Modest Research Proposals
The books reviewed present a glimpse of what it means to ap-
proach the study of constitutional law on a comparative basis. As
this commentary has made clear, these books contribute significantly
to the development of comparative constitutional law as a field of
study and analysis. The books may also encourage more research in
the comparative field. Nonetheless, the needs of comparative consti-
tutional law remain very basic. From the perspective of the Ameri-
can scholar they include: (1) good translations of foreign
constitutional cases; (2) solid descriptions of the constitutional ma-
chinery of countries whose high tribunals invite comparison with the
United States Supreme Court; and (3) accurate restatements of for-
eign constitutional doctrine.
Genuine comparative analysis can proceed only after these basic
tasks have been performed. A useful approach, as the books reviewed
demonstrate, is to focus on particular problems of governance. The
problem approach is most feasible when three conditions are satis-
fied. First, the problem must be common to several nations. Second,
as suggested earlier, the problem must be studied within similar con-
stitutional frameworks and against the backdrop of diverse social,
political, and cultural settings. Third, the problem must be one that
can be abstracted from its sociopolitical context.
These conditions represent three approaches to the comparative
enterprise. The first approach is descriptive, and includes a legal
analysis of the differences and similarities in constitutional doctrine,
along with the identification of common and diverging trends of con-
stitutional law. The second approach is broadly "sociologial" in
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character. It seeks to relate constitutional policy to cultural, reli-
gious, and political variables. This approach also considers varia-
tions in judicial structures, constitutional provisions, modes of
judicial review, and legal traditions, including the education and val-
ues of individual judges. The final approach is normative. Here the
enterprise constitutes a search for the principles that ought to govern
constitutional interpretation. Following Plato's method in Laws, it is
a search "for principles of justice and political obligation that tran-
scend the culture-bound opinions and conventions of a particular
political community. '23
B. The Value of the Enterprise
The final part of this essay discusses the significance of compara-
tive constitutional law as a scholarly discipline.2 4 The enterprise has
two interrelated goals. The first goal is to broaden the student's un-
derstanding of his own constitutional system. "[J]urisprudence with-
out comparative understanding can scarcely rise above the level of
provincial casuistry and empirical craft .... -25 In short, the com-
parative approach should liberate students from the ethnocentrism
associated with the exclusive study of their own legal system. "Com-
parative legal study," writes Alexander Smith, "enlarges the context,
multiplies the instances, sharpens the issues, and enables one to real-
ize that some defects in the law are not inevitable. ' 26 It also shows
that the acknowledged merits of the American system are not re-
garded as inevitable by other constitutional democracies.
These observations do not imply that comparison is always un-
dertaken to engineer changes in one's own legal system. Foreign
models of constitutional government may or may not apply to the
American experience. Rather, the comparative approach is likely to
enrich a person's understanding and appreciation of his own constitu-
tional system. W. Cole Durham makes the point eloquently: "[The
comparative enterprise can be] an interpretive effort which sheds
light on the meaning of one's own insitutions by indirection - by
penetrating the 'machinery' of another system sufficiently to reveal
the contours and drives of the human consciousness that created it
and thereby to'make visible what familiarity hides in unconscious
23 Kommers, The Value of Comparative Constitutional Law, 9 J. MAR. J. PRAC. PROc. 685,
692 (1976).
24 For an extended discussion of this topic, see id at 685-95.
25 E. RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAws: A COMPARATIVE STUDY xiii (1st ed. 1945).
26 Smith, spia note 6, at 8.
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understanding of one's own system."'27 It is in this sense that the
comparative enterprise can truly enrich the study of American con-
stitutional law.
On the other hand, the comparative approach is not without
relevance to the development of American constitutional law. Indeed,
as Durham also reminds us, to deny other experiences in constitu-
tional government "would be to succumb to a- thoroughgoing cul-
tural relativism which denies the possibility and benefits of cross-
cultural fertilization. '2 8 Comparative constitutional law could de-
velop into a source of constitutional interpretation in the United
States. After all, the influence of American constitutionalism abroad
has been substantial.29 The Murphy and Tanenhaus casebook in-
cludes numerous foreign opinions in which American cases are con-
sidered though not always followed. Any suggestion that the process
can not or should not work in reverse would be unabashedly ethno-
centric. Considering the rich body of constitutional case law now
available in Europe an observer conceded: "It is possible that we
may borrow in the future from the experience of the European Con-
stitutional Courts rather than contribute to it - that there will be
another period of give and take between the new and olds worlds.130
Clearly, this is not to say that American judges have less to learn
from leading constitutional tribunals outside of Europe.
The particular doctrinal outcomes of foreign cases are probably
less important to American students and practitioners than the con-
stitutional reasoning supporting those outcomes. Foreign constitu-
tional tribunals have occasionally reviewed their own reasoning in
light of American constitutional interpretation. Why shouldn't the
Supreme Court reciprocate? An investigation of foreign cases may
lead to the discovery of serious flaws in American constitutional rea-
soning or to new perspectives on balancing values such as equality,
liberty, and justice. It might also lead to the discovery of a common
27 W. Cole Durham, Religion and the Public Schools: Constitutional Analysis in Ger-
many and the United States (Paper presented at the First Annual Conference of the Western
Association for German Studies, October 21, 1977), at 3.
28 Id at 2.
29 See, e.g., C. FRIEDRICH, THE IMPACT OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM ABROAD
(1967). A massive multi-volume project entitled "The Bicentennial Commemoration of the
Influence of the United States Constitutional Abroad" is currently underway. Each book in
the project will be devoted to the influence of the U.S. Constitution on a particular country.
The project is under the general editorship of Albert P. Blaustein, Professor at Rutgers Uni-
versity School of Law (Camden).
30 Dietze, American and Europe - Decline and Emergene ofJudicial Review, 44 VA. L. REV.
1233, 1272 (1958).
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core of constitutional doctrine that could point American constitu-
tional interpretation in new directions. "Common core" analysis
could lead to a more objective legal basis for judicial policy.
American justices have occasionally looked to foreign courts for
guidance in deciding cases involving procedural due process and fed-
eral-state relations.31 Rarely, however, do their opinions refer to for-
eign cases dealing with substantive constitutional issues such as
church-state relations, political representation, free speech and press,
conscientious objection, the rights of minorities to equal protection,
and other issues covered in the books reviewed. On may wonder, for
example, whether the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade3 2
would have been different had the Justices considered the reasoning
of the abortion cases included in the two books reviewed. Of course,
when dealing with countries outside of the Anglo-American experi-
ence the linguistic barrier is a difficult one to hurdle. Even so, except
for Justice Douglas, who studied Indian constitutional law,33 and
Justice Frankfurter, who frequently cited foreign cases in his opin-
ions, 34 few Justices have manifested any interest in the evolving con-
stitutional case law of other nations. This may change, however, if
comparative constitutional law gains popularity as an academic sub-
ject in the United States. The publication of the books reviewed in
this essay may help to bring this about.
31 Examples of such cases are Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 556-
68 (1980) (citing English cases); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'r of New York Harbor, 378
U.S. 52, 58-63 (1964) (citing several English cases); U.S. v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301,
314 n.21 (1947) (citing an Australian case); and Pigeon River Improvement, Slide & Boom
Co. v. Charles W. Cox, Ltd., 291 U.S. 138 (1934) (citing several Canadian cases). Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) is a recent instance where the U.S. Supreme Court has con-
sciously rejected a procedural due process practice colnmonly accepted in other legal systems.
Of this decision, Robert E. Rodes, Jr. has remarked that "it is difficult to see what the
Supreme Court of the United States has in mind if not a Volkrgeist when it holds that an
American accused of a serious crime cannot have a fair trial if he is denied a jury, whereas
everyone else in the world can." R. RODES, JR., THE LEGAL ENTERPRISE 19 (1976).
32 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
33 See W. DoUGLAS, WE THE JUDGES (1955).
34 Justice Frankfurter displayed considerable knowledge of Anglo-American case law.
Examples of opinions in which he cites English, Canadian, and Australian cases are Stein v.
New York, 346 U.S. 156, 200 (1953) (dissenting); United States v. County of Allegheny, 322
U.S. 174, 198 (1944) (dissenting); and Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 462-63 n.4 (1939)
(separate opinion). In County ofAlleghen.y, he concluded his dissent with these words:
In respect to the problem we are considering, the constitutional relation of the Do-
minion of Canada to its constituent Provinces is the same as that of the United
States to the States. A recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada is therefore
pertinent. In City of Vancouver v. Attorney-General of Canada, [1944] S.C.R. 23,
that Court denied the Dominion's claim to immunity in a situation precisely like
this, as I believe we should deny the claim of the Government. 322 U.S. at 198.
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